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i. introduction
“All i am asking for is to Be treated like every other person in the united states Who is accused of a crime, including terrorism, and to Be given 
a fair trial in an american court,”1 said Ali Saleh Kahlah al-
Marri, speaking through his attorney in a recent article in The 
New Yorker. In contravention of centuries of jurisprudence, the 
United States has discarded the criminal trial in favor of preven-
tative detention during the “war on terror.” It seems, however, 
that al-Marri—the last individual held inside the United States 
with the “enemy combatant” classification—will finally get his 
wish. Al-Marri’s military detention ended and federal prosecu-
tors indicted him for conspiring to provide material support to 
al-Qaeda.2 Thus, al-Marri will likely receive a fair trial, an 
opportunity that every criminal suspect—including an alleged 
terrorist—deserves.
The administration of President Barack Obama has taken 
other steps to roll back some detention policies of the admin-
istration of former President George W. Bush. On January 20, 
2009, Obama ordered the closure of the detention facility at the 
U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba within one year.3 
While this is a positive step toward compliance with interna-
tional law, the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, 
by itself, is insufficient. Attorney General Eric Holder recently 
stated that it is essential that the administration’s new policy 
to govern detainees “operate in a manner that strengthens our 
national security, is consistent with our values and is governed 
by law.”4 If Obama hopes to achieve these aims, preventative 
detention in any context outside of an actual armed conflict as 
defined by international humanitarian law (IHL), and any trial 
in which rights fall short of constitutional and human rights law 
requirements must be rejected. Closing Guantánamo is appropri-
ately viewed as just the beginning.
This article examines two questions. First, can the United 
States preventatively detain al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives? 
Second, can the United States use a system lacking significant 
features of a fair trial to criminally prosecute al-Qaeda and 
Taliban operatives?
ii. tHe united StateS may not  
preventativeLy detain aLLeged terroriStS  
except in Strict adHerence to iHL
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, several executive 
orders and statutes have claimed to grant authority to detain 
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President Obama signs the order to close Guantanamo.
“enemy combatants” without access to trials or certain proce-
dural safeguards. After protracted litigation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held many aspects of these orders and laws unconsti-
tutional, but the underlying assertion of power to detain enemy 
combatants without access to trial remains. There is cause for 
concern that the Obama administration is continuing to adhere 
to the “war on terror” mentality.
The Department of Justice (DoJ) recently filed an alarming 
brief in In Re Guantánamo Bay Litigation in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. The Obama administration 
reaffirmed the Bush administration’s assertion of the power to 
preventatively detain certain persons.5 This suggests that pre-
ventative detention will continue after Guantánamo Bay closes. 
While the Obama brief declares an end to the categorization 
“enemy combatant,” the substance of Bush’s policy remains: 
“The President . . . has the authority to detain persons who were 
part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces 
or associated forces . . . ”6 While Obama is limiting the rhetoric 
long associated with the “war on terror,” his policies continue 
many of Bush’s, including reliance on a war paradigm.
Proponents of preventative detention rely on an emotional 
argument and several flawed legal arguments. Fear encapsulates 
the emotional argument, which essentially states that certain 
persons—“human missiles of destruction”7—pose an existen-
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rule.15 As exceptions to the general rule, the UN Charter allows 
resort to armed force in two instances. The first exception allows 
the UN Security Council to authorize force in order to maintain 
international peace and security,16 and the second permits acts 
of self-defense under Article 51:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs . . . until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.”17
While contention surrounds the definition of “armed attack,” 
state practice, decisions of the ICJ and actions taken by the 
United Nations must inform the discussion. Simply put, an 
armed attack can be carried out by conventional armed forces, 
armed bands or irregulars as long as the attack is “sufficiently 
grave” and is not an isolated or limited use of force.18 The U.S. 
government has traditionally assumed that terrorist attacks can 
be classified as armed attacks, which is an assumption that 
predates 9/11. Most states and many international lawyers, how-
ever, disagree unless the terrorist act occurs within the context 
of an ongoing-armed conflict.19 No armed conflict existed, or 
could have existed, between the United States and al-Qaeda on 
September 11, 2001 since armed conflict requires “protracted 
armed violence” between two or more states or within one state 
against “organized armed groups.”20 To attempt to fit the U.S./
al-Qaeda struggle within that definition would require a signifi-
cant linguistic perversion.
The U.S. government reliance on UN Security Council 
Resolution 136821 for international support for its armed con-
flict with al-Qaeda is misplaced. The Resolution recognized 
the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in 
accordance with the Charter.”22 This does not express approval 
of a state’s ability to declare “war” on al-Qaeda. Instead, it 
stresses the right of self-defense under the Charter, which does 
not include attacking a non-state actor for a terrorist attack. If 
anything, the Security Council acquiesced silently to the United 
States’ use of force, but it did not sanction the use of force. 
Under international law, 9/11 should have been considered a 
heinous criminal act, not an act of war. The U.S. government’s 
assertion that an armed conflict exists does not make it so.
Of course, there are some academic and policy experts who 
wish to “update” IHL by expanding the definition of “armed 
conflict” and “armed attack.” They claim that current IHL defi-
nitions cannot address Twenty-first Century threats. Any changes 
in this vein would be dangerous to law and policy for decades to 
come. The horrors of the Second World War informed the UN 
Charter’s rules on the use of force and current IHL principles, 
which are both intended to restrict armed conflict. To expand 
tial threat to the United States and its interests, which justifies 
their preventative detention. This ignores a significant feature 
of modern, liberal democratic governments: the fair trial. The 
right to a fair trial, an idea born of the Enlightenment, is found 
in international law8 and in U.S. domestic law.9 Appeals to our 
fear of “human missiles of destruction” weakened respect for 
this fundamental right. While the United States and other nations 
face a significant terrorist threat, this threat does not justify dis-
carding fundamental values and principles of law. Some propo-
nents of preventative detention claim that human rights groups, 
by holding fast to long-established principles, exhibit a callous 
disregard for the potential threat, especially faced by Iraqi and 
Afghan civilians, from released detainees. As a former U.S. 
Army judge advocate who served in Iraq for fourteen months, I 
understand the threat posed to Iraqis and Afghanis by terrorists 
who lack fundamental respect for human life. The U.S. policy 
apparatus, however, must strike at the roots of terrorism and 
societal disaffection rather than compromising our principles. 
Full respect and realization of all human rights would actually 
go a long way toward eradicating many of the contexts within 
which terrorism breeds.
The flawed legal arguments rest on several bodies of law. 
The Bush administration relied on the naked proposition that the 
inherent powers of the “commander in chief ” authorized preven-
tative detention. Thankfully, the Obama administration shelved 
this argument in its brief. Instead, the government relies on two 
bodies of law in tandem: U.S. law and IHL. According to this 
argument, U.S. law sanctions preventative detention since the 
U.S. continues to engage al-Qaeda and the Taliban in an “armed 
conflict.”10 After 9/11, all three branches of government declared 
the United States at war with al-Qaeda: Congress in the 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists11; 
the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Hamdi,12 and statements from the 
previous and current presidential administrations. According to 
the Obama administration, since an armed conflict exists, IHL 
principles apply. This is not an appropriate conclusion. During 
properly classified armed conflicts, states may preventatively 
detain enemy forces to keep them from returning to the battle-
field. Due to the considerable power associated with this right, 
strict rules apply within international law regarding when an 
armed conflict exists giving rise to this authority. When armed 
conflict does not exist, human rights law applies, under which 
detention must result from a fair trial.13
The issue becomes whether it is proper to classify our fight 
against al-Qaeda as an armed conflict. The United Nations (UN) 
Charter is the supreme source of international law in this area. 
It prohibits states from the use of force and the threat of force.14 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considers this prohibi-
tion to be a jus cogens norm, and therefore a non-derogable 
[Obama] must avoid trying alleged terrorists in any 
court other than a regularly constituted court offering the 
full panoply of constitutional rights and privileges.
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this area of law would increase the likelihood of horrors the 
world sought to minimize after 1945 by making it easier for a 
state to resort to armed force.
Nevertheless, since the United States assumes a state of war 
exists, it claims the right to preventatively detain. While the 
United States did, in fact, capture some Guantánamo detainees 
during armed conflict in Afghanistan, a significant problem 
exists; the United States violated IHL by moving the individu-
als across the globe for purposes of interrogation without con-
ducting certain procedural safeguards required under the Third 
Geneva Convention and U.S. Army Regulation 190-8. These 
provisions require that if any doubt exists about a captured per-
son’s status, a hearing must be held to determine whether he is 
a prisoner of war, war criminal, or civilian.23 The U.S. military 
did not conduct any hearings until years after capture and they 
took place thousands of miles away from Afghanistan. Even 
more troubling is that many Guantánamo detainees were not 
combatants on a battlefield—individuals fighting, or providing 
direct support to armed groups fighting U.S. military forces in 
a theater of ongoing military operations.24 A significant differ-
ence at law exists between individuals captured on a battlefield 
in Afghanistan in 2001 and someone arrested in a Pakistani safe 
house in 2003 accused of organizing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
The former are armed combatants subject to IHL and the latter 
is a terrorist subject to criminal justice.
Even within the contexts of the ongoing-armed conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan the United States should not exercise the 
power of preventative detention. During “international armed 
conflicts”—conflicts between two or more states—the Geneva 
Conventions operate in a straightforward manner to allow pre-
ventative detention of prisoners of war and the prosecution of 
war criminals.25 In the short periods before the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan both 
conflicts likely fit the definition of international armed conflict. 
Currently, however, the situations in both countries are “non-
international armed conflicts” because U.S. opposition comes 
from insurgent forces within those states.26
Little is codified regarding detention in non-international 
armed conflicts. The U.S. government attempts to capitalize on 
this by asserting that in “novel conflicts” where detention rules 
appear less precise, the rules of international armed conflict 
should govern.27 This further militarization of the law must be 
avoided in favor of reliance on human rights law. Only when 
an international armed conflict exists can derogable human 
rights rules be abrogated in favor of certain narrowly tailored 
IHL rules.28 If the specific conditions authorizing IHL rules do 
not exist then IHL should not be applied. Today, the Iraqi and 
Afghani governments allow U.S. forces to operate inside their 
states. Those governments should oversee all detentions inside 
their borders, not the U.S. military. In Iraq, under the new Status 
of Forces Agreement, the United States may only detain if vested 
with such authority by the Iraqi government and all detainees 
must be transferred to Iraqi custody.29 Afghanistan requires a 
similar policy.
Those who attack civilians, U.S. personnel, or otherwise 
engage in attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq should face prosecution 
in the local criminal justice system. This approach benefits host 
countries trying to rebuild their civil and political infrastructure. 
Of course, upon the detection of intelligence pertaining to U.S. 
security, the local government could easily allow U.S. personnel 
to interrogate detainees while remaining respectful of human 
rights law. After capturing individuals who have plotted attacks 
on targets inside the United States, criminal indictments in U.S. 
courts, followed by extradition, would comport with interna-
tional law.
Therefore, in order to conform to international law, the United 
States may not hold anyone in indefinite preventative detention 
in its fight against al-Qaeda or in Afghanistan and Iraq.
iii. tHe united StateS SHouLd onLy reLy on criminaL 
proSecutionS tHat incLude fair triaL guaranteeS
Many commentators argue that our criminal justice system 
cannot meet today’s terrorist threat; however, this contention 
should not be accepted without substantial proof. Constitutional 
law, the criminal justice model, and human rights law are well 
adapted to meet terrorist threats.30 Until proven otherwise, we 
must return to that model. Unfortunately, a consensus is build-
ing in the United States that tribunals lacking those safeguards 
may be used for alleged terrorists. The justifications include 
national security concerns, the possibility of acquittal, the fact 
that the military did not collect evidence, and the inability to use 
evidence obtained by coercion or torture. Proposals include a 
stand-alone national security court, re-constituted military com-
missions, and simply instituting special rules for terrorism cases 
in certain federal courts. Generally, all of the proposed models 
agree on allowing relaxed standards of evidence, limiting the 
rights of a defendant to confront evidence and witnesses against 
him, allowing the introduction of evidence obtained by coercive 
means, and limiting other constitutional protections such as 
rights to a speedy trial and access to counsel. Despite rhetoric 
to the contrary, the practical concerns voiced by proponents of 
national security courts are overstated. Numerous organizations, 
such as Human Rights First, have issued compelling reports 
demonstrating that regularly constituted criminal courts can 
handle terrorism cases.31 The convenience arguments offered 
by proponents of national security courts do not overcome the 
constitutional requirement of, and value in, a fair trial. Even 
if some admittedly dangerous Guantánamo detainees cannot 
be prosecuted because of stale evidence, tainted evidence, or 
because the particular act was not criminal at the time of com-
mission, we cannot disregard our solemn values of liberty and 
justice simply due to fear.
Other commentators propose the use of courts-martial. 
While tempting, this idea is fraught with problems. Guantánamo 
detainees could conceivably be tried under Article 18 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the statute govern-
ing the prosecution of U.S. service members, which allows for 
personal jurisdiction over “any person who by the law of war 
is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any 
punishment permitted by the law of war.”32 Attempting to use 
this system would guarantee years more litigation to deter-
mine the applicability of the “law of war” to the specific cases 
brought. Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, it is not clear that the ubiquitous charges of con-
spiracy and providing material support to terrorism are valid war 
crimes.33 Congress could amend the jurisdictional provisions 
and some of the substantive crimes in the UCMJ, but this is not 
an attractive option since it is likely to be viewed as too similar 
to the discredited military commission system. It may also raise 
ex post facto and statute of limitations concerns. Ultimately, this 
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option should be avoided, given the human rights norm of trying 
civilians in military courts only in exceptional cases.34
Reliance on federal courts allows the United States to return 
to its legal and philosophical tradition. The criminal trial, with 
all its procedures, remains the ideal method for determining 
truth and meting out justice. The right to a fair trial should be 
considered so fundamental that only a monumental justification 
could allow non-compliance, such as an open rebellion that 
threatens the existence of the state. All Guantánamo detainees 
must be charged criminally in a regularly constituted court or be 
released from military custody.
iv. concLuSion
Obama’s tasks to close Guantánamo and to determine the fate 
of detainees are difficult for political reasons. The legal answer 
remains readily available if he chooses to return to the rules 
existing on September 10, 2001. In his inauguration speech on 
January 29, 2009, Obama declared:
We reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils that 
we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the 
rule of law and the rights of man—a charter expanded by 
the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, 
and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.
In order to ensure the respect of our nation’s constitutional 
principles, and our international obligations, Obama must pro-
hibit preventative detention except in strict adherence to IHL. 
He must avoid trying alleged terrorists in any court other than 
a regularly constituted court offering the full panoply of con-
stitutional rights and privileges. Finally, moving forward in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, detainees should be held under the sovereign 
authority of those countries and handled within their criminal 
justice systems. The argument that “the rules changed after 9/11” 
should carry no weight. As the recent report from the Eminent 
Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 
an initiative of the International Commission of Jurists made up 
of leading experts in the field, explained, “the legal framework 
that existed prior to 9/11 is extremely robust and effective: inter-
national human rights and international humanitarian law were 
elaborated precisely to guarantee people’s security.”35 Our laws, 
inspired by our long-cherished values, are capable of meeting 
Twenty-first Century threats.  HRB
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